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The future may 
hold trade-o!s 
that need to be 
carefully balanced.
Executive  Summary
Since the last ICT sector performance review of 2006, much has happened in Namibia for the better. 
Namibia now has three mobile operators, a single ministry in charge of policy for the sector, new 
policies, a new Act, and it should soon have a new stronger and more independent regulator. Namibia 
has started to catch up with South Africa and Botswana. Prices have more than halved for mobile 
telephony and Internet access, and broadband has found its way to Namibia in mobile and !xed 
versions. Perceptions of stakeholders regarding the regulatory environment improved accordingly 
in 2009 compared to 2006, indicating that changes under Minister of Communications, Joel 
Kaapanda‘s watch have been well received. The second mobile licence and subsequent competition 
in the mobile sector in 2006 was the !rst game-changer. Enforcing the licence conditions of Leo and 
MTC (termination rates based on cost) in 2009 added to that new game being played more fairly.
Many challenges remain however. Telecom Namibia will need to change course and focus on 
pro!tability or face the risk of becoming another indebted state-owned enterprise (SOE) with 
dwindling signi!cance for Namibia’s telecommunication sector. The Namibian Government would 
be well advised to sell a large share of Telecom Namibia to a strong operator with low-cost CMDA 
expertise. 
The !xed-line sector may require regulatory intervention, separating wholesale from resale, and 
unbundling of the local loop to allow other operators access to Telecom Namibia’s customers. That 
might sound like a threat to Telecom Namibia’s existence but is likely to be a blessing – just as 
competition was a blessing to MTC, which is now a much stronger and more pro!table company 
than it ever has been.
The new regulator, CRAN, needs to build regulatory capacity and establish credibility in the market. 
Licences and laws need to be enforced consistently and transparently. The regulator needs to 
balance consumers’ interests and return on investment. Namibia’s 13 years of mobile monopoly has 
made that easy in the period 2006 to 2009. Lower prices increased consumer welfare and provided 
operators with more pro!ts and reasons to invest. The future may hold trade-o"s that need to be 
carefully balanced.
The key !ndings of this report are:
The contribution of the communication sector to GDP has steadily increased over the past 
18 years.
MTC is #ourishing while Telecom Namibia is increasingly struggling to deliver returns that 
would be expected from any owner other than government.
Namibia fares well when comparing the cheapest prepaid product available in a country, 
occupying the middle of the !eld in a comparison of 18 African countries. However, for the 
cheapest product available from dominant operators, in this case MTC, Namibia is the third 
most expensive prepaid operator, surpassed only by Cameroon and Burkina Faso. This is 
signi!cant since it means the majority of people pay high prices, with MTC having a market 
share of around 80% and the bulk of its subscribers being on prepaid.
Lowering mobile termination rates towards the cost of an e$cient operator increased 
competition in the sector and led to lower prices, more subscribers and even better 
performance of the incumbent mobile operator, MTC, which claimed that the opposite 
would be the case. There certainly has been no waterbed e"ect.
The telecommunications regulatory environment is perceived by stakeholders as having 
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Falling prices 
and economic 
growth has led to 
a narrowing of the 
digital divide.
Introduction
The Namibian ICT Sector Performance Review (SPR) analyses recent developments in the sector and 
provides information and analysis for policy makers and regulators. It draws on data from nationally 
representative household surveys conducted by Research ICT Africa in 2004 and 2007, data collected 
from operators and industry stakeholders, stakeholder perception surveys regarding the e$ciency 
of the regulatory environment for 2006 and 2009, and price comparisons conducted regularly by 
the Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit (NEPRU) based on OECD price basket methodology.
Table 1: Namibia’s digital divide at a household level (RIA 2004 and 2007 surveys)
Households  
with  
working...      
Namibia Urban Rural Urban  Rural  
2004 2007 2004 2007 2004 2007 2004 2007
Electricity 34% 47% 78% 81% 6% 24% 72% 57%
Fixed-line 
phone
13% 17% 31% 32% 2% 8% 29% 24%
Radio 77% 73% 88% 82% 70% 66% 18% 16%
TV 31% 38% 71% 72% 5% 15% 66% 57%
Computer 5% 11% 11% 23% 0% 4% 11% 19%
Internet 
Connection
2% 3% 4% 7% 0% 1% 4% 6%
The digital divide (the divide between those that have access to electricity and ICTs and those that do 
not) declined in Namibia from 2004 to 2007. More households had access to electricity, a !xed-line 
phone, a TV, a computer and an internet connection at home in 2007 compared to 2004. Only the 
number of households with a working radio declined during that period, indicating a substitution 
of radio by TV. Even the di"erence between rural and urban areas’ access to electricity, !xed-line 
phones, radio and TV at home declined. For computer and Internet however, despite more rural 
and urban households having access, the di"erence increased. Computer and Internet access, apart 
from requiring more !nancial resources once-o" and as a monthly commitment, are also limited by 
educational barriers. 
This success can be attributed to general economic growth, but also to falling prices for 
telecommunication and Internet access and hence Namibia’s policies and regulatory environment. 
The link between policies, regulation and sector performance is a key component of this review.
The next chapter describes Namibia’s telecommunication sector and key players. The third chapter 
raises selected policy and regulatory issues. The fourth chapter evaluates sector performance of 
the telecommunication sector by evaluating the regulatory performance and comparing price and 
other developments to other African countries.








During the 1990s, Namibia experienced a fundamental change in the way telecommunication 
services were delivered through the creation of the commercialised !xed-line operator, Telecom 
Namibia, in 1992, followed by the commercialised mobile operator, Mobile Telecommunications 
Corporation (MTC), in 1995, both owned by Government through the holding company Namibia 
Post and Telecommunications Holdings (NPTH). A second mobile operator, Leo1, was licensed 
in 2006, an event which highlighted the dire need to revise the country’s telecoms legislation, 
especially after Telecom Namibia entered the wireless market with Switch. Drawn out consultations 
on a new Communications Act !nally resulted in the passing of new telecoms legislation in 2009. 
The legislation includes provision for a Communications Regulatory Authority of Namibia (CRAN) 
and stipulates that telecoms companies must be majority Namibian owned. Despite all the 
shortcomings associated with its legal framework, greater competition has allowed Namibians 
to bene!t from more choice and lower prices in mobile telephony. Ownership remains an issue 
and the jury is out on whether public, public-private, and private sector operators can successfully 
operate in competition with each other on a level playing !eld.
Until recently, Namibia’s telecoms sector was governed by legislation that was 17 years old. The 
1992 Posts and Telecommunications Act2 and the accompanying Post and Telecommunications 
Companies Establishment Act3 made provision for the establishment of Namibia Post and 
Telecommunications Holdings (NPTH), the holding company of Telecom Namibia, Namibia Post and 
later, in 1995, Mobile Telecommunications (MTC), under the line Ministry of Works, Transport and 
Communication (MWTC). NPTH was established as a property development company providing 
property facilities and custodial services to its subsidiary companies but little in the way of strategic 
guidance, coordination, support or material involvement in the business decisions of its three 
subsidiaries, which operated more or less independently of each other.
In the same year the Namibian Communications Commission Act gave rise to the NCC. The NCC 
was originally established primarily to licence radio frequency users and regulate radio and TV 
broadcasters with little consideration for the telecoms sector. The main function of the NCC was 
to allocate radio frequencies to users including radio and TV broadcasters and mobile telephony 
operators as well as to award licences to telecoms operators. The advent of MTC in 1995 required an 
amendment to the NCC Act and gave the NCC the power to regulate the prices MTC was allowed 
to charge. Later, in 2000, the NCC was given the responsibility to coordinate the application and 
tendering process for the second cellular licence. However, when it became clear that it did not 
have the authority, a second amendment to the NCC Act was passed by Parliament in March 2004.4 
This legislation and the accompanying institutional structures re#ected government’s thinking at 
the time. Prior to the 1992 Act, telecoms had been the responsibility of a government department 
within the Ministry of Works, Transport and Communication. Both the income and expenditure side 
of its operations, including its investment decisions, were dictated to a large extent by national 
budgetary allocations. In what proved a far-sighted move, Government – with Swedish support – 
was convinced that the high-tech and fast-moving telecoms sector would be better served by a 
commercial entity rather than a bureaucratic government department.
NPTH
As pointed out above, Cabinet memoranda at the time viewed NPTH as a temporary vehicle allowing 
Telecom to subsidise Nampost, which was expected to take far longer to start breaking even. As 
things turned out, NamPost reached pro!tability far earlier than expected. Over time all three NPTH 
subsidiaries have developed capabilities and assets in areas that were originally envisaged for NPTH, 
although all property used by the three subsidiaries is owned and maintained by NPTH.
1  CellOne rebranded into Leo in 2009
2  Posts and Telecommunications Act (Act No. 19 of 1992)
3  Posts and Telecommunications Companies Establishment Act (Act No. 17 of 1992)
4  Namibian Communications Commission Amendment Act (Act No. 4 of 2004)
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Table 2: Chain of events
Year Event
1992 Post and Telecoms Act passed with MWTC as line ministry  
Namibia Post and Telecoms Holdings (NPTH) established 
Telecom Namibia established 
Bo Eklöf appointed MD of Telecom Namibia 
Namibian Communications Commission established under MIB 
1995 Mobile Telecommunications (MTC) established with Swedish technical partners Telia and Swedfund 
Per Eriksson appointed MD of MTC
1996 Theo Mberirua appointed MD of Telecom Namibia
1998 Bertil Guve replaces Per Eriksson as MD of MTC
1999 Telecommunications Policy and Regulatory Framework adopted envisaging liberalisation by 2004 
and second mobile operator 
MTC introduces Tango prepaid service
2000 NCC nominated to coordinate second cellular licence
2001 Bengt Strenge appointed MD of MTC
2002 Draft Communications Bill introduced to make way for Communications Authority of Namibia (CAN)
2002 Frans Ndoroma appointed MD of Telecom Namibia
2003 Deadline for granting second cellular licence missed
2004 Namibia Communications Commission Amendment Act passed 
Telia Overseas AB and Swedfund International AB sell 49% of MTC to NPTH for approximately 
N$500 million 
Granting of second cellular licence delayed 
Telecom Namibia enters agreement with Mundo Startel of Angola
2005 Deadline for second !xed-line licence missed 
Telecom Namibia signs agreement with VSNL/Tata for the Second National Operator in South Africa
2006 Portugal Telecom buys 34% of MTC for N$1.02 billion 
PowerCom (Leo) awarded second cellular licence and announces SIM cards will be out by end 
of the year 
Mac Allman appointed MD of Leo 
José Ferreira replaces Bengt Strenge as MD of MTC 
Telecom Namibia introduces Switch !xed-wireless service 
MTC launches 3G broadband service
2007 Leo o$cially launches service 
Lars-Christian Luel appointed MD of Leo 
Miguel Geraldes appointed MD of MTC
2008 Ministry of Information and Broadcasting changed to Ministry of Information and Communication 
Technology 
Joel Kaapanda appointed Minister 
Telecom launches bond programme
2009 Orascom buys Leo 
Soban Pasha appointed MD of Leo 
Cabinet lifts restrictions on Switch 
NCC regulates interconnection charges 
Leo tenders for BEE partners 
CellOne renamed Leo 
MTC and Leo awarded international voice licences 
Telecom granted credit rating by Fitch Ratings 
Communications Act passed 
Communications Regulatory Authority of Namibia (CRAN) board appointed
2010 June: Communication Act not yet activated 
June: Minister seeks help from ITU to !ne tune Communications Act
Note:       MWTC (Ministry of Works, Transport and Communication) 
                 MIB (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting)
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MTC did well until 
2006 in spite of 
being a monopoly, 
and even better 
afterwards
Telecom Namibia
Rather than opt for outright privatisation, Government created Telecom Namibia. There appear 
to have been three main reasons why Government was determined to keep Telecom in state 
hands. First, state ownership had historically been the classic prescription in the case of !xed-line 
networks which possessed the characteristics of a natural monopoly. Without regulation, private 
ownership of a natural monopoly would always be prone to abuse. Second, Government wanted 
Telecom Namibia to pursue developmental as well as commercial goals and was concerned that a 
private company would “cherry pick” – serving richer urban areas while neglecting the poorer rural 
population. Third, a certain amount of economic nationalism baulked at the idea that the country’s 
telecoms infrastructure (“the family silver”) could end up in the hands of foreigners, a likely outcome 
if the company were to be privatised. Furthermore, although this has never been explicitly stated, 
Telecom Namibia was to be part of a growing State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) sector serving as a 
training ground for a cadre of new black Namibian managers and professionals.
Telecom Namibia was to carry out its ambitious programme of investment without placing a direct 
burden on the national budget. It was to be allowed to recoup the costs of these investments 
through the prices it charged over a given period of time, and would be governed by a performance 
agreement with the MWTC, although this did not carry any legal backing. Furthermore, under the 
terms of its statutory licence, Telecom was granted the monopoly on international voice and data 
gateways to and from Namibia. Telecom Namibia was to focus on improving the country’s !xed-line 
telephony infrastructure and had a universal service obligation. No one seems to have thought at 
that stage that mobile telephony, which was still very much in its infancy in developing countries, 
had the greater potential to reach the vast mass of the country’s population. 
However, with no pro!t motive, no competition and only a weak regulatory framework consisting 
of a rather #imsy performance agreement with its line ministry, there were no strong incentives to 
perform. Although growth in turnover turned out to be relatively robust, pro!tability did not rise by 
anywhere near the same extent. As a study commissioned by SIDA5 pointed out, “a signi!cant part of 
Telecom’s top-line growth has been the result of sharp price increases at the expense of customers. 
Whereas turnover has grown more than !ve times since the corporatisation, installed DELs [Direct 
Exchange Lines] have merely doubled over the same period.” This came as no great surprise given 
Namibia’s geography and demographics and Telecom’s obligation to ful!l developmental goals.
MTC
MTC, created in 1995, came under the regulatory ambit of the NCC, requiring, as it did, the use of 
speci!c radio frequencies and therefore frequency licences. The arguments that applied to Telecom 
– natural monopoly, cherry picking and economic nationalism – could equally have been applied to 
MTC. Yet, perhaps because at the time cellular telephony was a relatively new technology requiring 
scarcer technical expertise, Government decided to take a di"erent approach towards MTC. Two 
signi!cant foreign partners and shareholders were brought in from the beginning and foreign MDs 
appointed (Swedish nationals Per Eriksson, then Bertil Guve, followed later by Bengt Strenge). MTC’s 
universal service obligation is de!ned in vague terms by its licence6, while LEO has very speci!c 
rollout obligations.7 
The introduction of prepaid services by MTC in 1999 helped boost its customer base to over 610,000 
subscribers by the time competition arrived in the mobile telephony market in 2006. 
From the word go, MTC had to pay Telecom for international tra$c. At that time cellular telephony 
was still in its infancy with “2G” GSM making its debut mostly in richer countries. However, in stark 
contrast to Telecom, MTC’s !nancial performance has been exceptional. In 2009 MTC made an after-
tax pro!t of N$388 million from a turnover of N$1,390 million – a pro!t margin of 28%. Until 2006 
MTC too was a monopoly. Yet, as former MD Bengt Strenge stated in one interview8, MTC did well
5  Resource Paper 2, Cooperation between Namibia and Sweden in the Transport and Communications Sectors:
 Commercialisation in the Namibian Transport and Communications Sectors, Herman Marais February 2006
6  Government Gazette No.3815, 29 March 2007, section 12
7  Government Gazette No.3676, 11 August 2006, appendix.
8  “We have done well in spite of being a monopoly.” Interview with Bengt Strenge, Insight Namibia, June 2005










inferior to a model 
that relies on 
competition
in spite of being a monopoly. Neighbouring Botswana achieved higher penetration rates more 
quickly with two privately-owned operators9.
In 2004 Telia and Swedfund sold their combined 49% shareholding in MTC to Government. Two 
years later in July 2006, 34% of MTC was sold to Portugal Telecom for N$1.02 billion following a 
competitive bidding process involving 15 companies. Portugal Telecom already had interests in 
South America and China and also in seven African countries where it had more than !ve million 
subscribers. Until 2004 it was also a major shareholder in Mascom of Botswana. Its operations in 
Angola (it owned 25% of Unitel) were undoubtedly a factor which helped it win the bid. And it was 
noteworthy that Government decided not to opt for a South African company. From the sale, a 
portion went to pay o" the loan used to pay Teleia and Swedfund, while N$648 million found its way 
into Government co"ers in the additional budget in November10. Portuguese national José Ferreira 
was appointed to replace MD Bengt Strenge who stepped down on 1 September 2006. Ferreira had 
worked for Mascom in Botswana for almost !ve years between 1998 and 2006.
Regulatory Approach
For years, few fundamental changes took place in Namibia’s telecoms sector. Telecom Namibia 
remained a monopoly provider of !xed-line services responsible to the MWTC, while MTC remained 
a monopoly provider of cellular services regulated by the NCC. Some diversi!cation in the provision 
was achieved: Telecom introduced toll-free services, ISDN, video-conferencing and voice mail 
services and established international connectivity between Namibia and the rest of the world via 
INTELSAT satellites. Telecom launched its long-awaited ASDL service in 2008 and had about 6000 
ADSL subscribers by the end of 2009. MTC introduced its prepaid Tango service in 1999, which 
allowed it to signi!cantly increase its customer base. The introduction of GPRS in 2004 further 
allowed Internet access from GPRS-enabled handsets.
Namibia’s overall telecoms performance during that time can be better assessed in comparison with 
other countries which have adopted di"erent approaches. The table below presents a comparison 
between Namibia, Botswana and South Africa. Botswana too has a 100% state-owned !xed-line 
operator, the Botswana Telecommunications Corporation (BTC), while in South Africa the state-
owned monopoly Telkom was partially privatised, #oating on the New York Stock Exchange and 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in 2003. While Namibia’s MTC has for the most part been a 
public-private partnership, Botswana licenced two entirely private companies, Mascom and Orange 
(previously Vista), from the beginning in 1998. South Africa started by granting two licences in 
1994, one to Vodacom, a 50:50 partnership between Telkom and the UK’s Vodafone, and MTN, an 
entirely private company. Privately owned CellC received its mobile licence in 2001 while Virgin 
Mobile South Africa, owned entirely by the UK’s Virgin Group plc., entered the market as a Virtual 
Network Operator (VNO) under a joint venture with CellC rather than as a full licence holder in 2006. 
Both Botswana and South Africa have independent regulatory authorities with far higher levels of 
resources than the NCC has ever enjoyed, even taking into account South Africa’s much larger size. 
Both are !nanced by a combination of licence fees and industry levies.
International comparisons of telecoms performance are often di$cult to make since there are so 
many di"erent prices for so many di"erent services. Clearly, however, price is a crucial determinant of 
teledensities and one can expect higher prices to be associated with lower teledensities, especially 
in countries with predominantly low-income populations. Crucially, Namibia historically came out 
poorly in price comparisons and both Botswana and South Africa had far higher mobile teledensities 
than Namibia, suggesting that Namibia’s state-owned monopoly model was inferior to a model that 
relies on competition between more than one company.
Government, through NPTH, was the sole shareholder of Telecom, the monopoly !xed line provider, 
and MTC, the monopoly cellular provider. Neither company directly trespassed on each other’s 
market. However, Telecom was clearly not as !nancially successful as MTC, which has perhaps made 
the greatest impact on providing telephone services to the masses thanks to Tango. In 2006 alone 
MTC was able to increase its customer base by 150,000 people thanks to reductions in the price of 
starter packs and lower priced recharge vouchers. Indirectly, MTC was steadily eroding the rationale
9  MTC had succeeded in attracting 610,000 customers out of a population of 2 million by the end of 2006, while
 neighbouring Botswana had 840,000 customers out of a population of 1.7 million a year before.
10  See “Statement for the Additional Budget – Financial Year 2006/07”, November 2006, paragraph 13.
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Competition 
introduced in 2006 
shook things up in 
Namibia
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for Telecom’s presence in the retail market. Added to this Telecom’s monopoly had been due to 
end by 2004 since the adoption of the Telecommunications Policy and Regulatory Framework for 
Namibia 199911.
Table 3: Namibia compared to Botswana and South Africa 
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Mobile active SIM 
cards in circulation 
2009*
1,637,530 1,874,101 27.6 million subscribers 
for 2009, MTN 16.1 million 
subscribers at the end of 
2009 and CellC 7.2 million 
subscribers at the end of 
2008
Population 2,103,761*** 1,776,494
Sources: * Annual statements of operators, ** No distinction between data and voice for international gateways, 
*** Namibian Census with medium projection, **** 2008 (Gillwald et al 2010), ***** March 2010, source Telecom 
Namibia
Things started to change dramatically when the !rst major new player in Namibia’s telecoms 
sector since 1995 arrived, following the granting of a second cellular licence in 2006. The draft 
Communications Bill, !rst drafted in 1999 as a follow-up to the SADC Protocol of 199812, had 
envisaged the introduction of competition in cellular telephony by 2003 through the granting of a 
second cellular licence. However, it was not until August 2006 that a second licence was awarded to 
Leo (owned by PowerCom) after a run-o" between just two competing bids (the other being from 
ZDE of China). PowerCom was a company with four major shareholders: a Norwegian group called 
Telecom Management Partner (39%), NamPower (37%), Nam-mic (12%), and Old Mutual Namibia 
(10%) as well as an educational trust established by the shareholders (2%). The company’s origins 
lay in the idea that NamPower’s !bre optic control network could be used as the basis for a second 
operator. PowerCom’s licence, for which it agreed to pay N$65 million prior to launching, laid out a 
detailed timetable for the roll-out of its network across Namibia. The company estimated it would 
invest N$2 billion over a period of !ve years. PowerCom was initially headed by Mac Allman and 
11  “Telecommunications Policy and Regulatory Framework for Namibia 1999”, Ministry of Information and
  Broadcasting, 1999.
12  Telecommunications Policies for SADC, June 1998.
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the brand to an 
extent that a 
rebranding seems 
plausible
employed Dr Leake Hangala, previously the MD of one of its shareholders, NamPower, as a director. 
The PowerCom board of directors was made up of representatives of its four major shareholders.
Early on, PowerCom stated its intention to compete on service quality rather than on price. It o"ered 
3G HSDPA (High Speed Downlink Packet Access), and its prepaid service was entirely electronic, 
eliminating the need for the more costly and less secure voucher system used by MTC. PowerCom 
started with several advantages. It could invest in the most up-to-date technology without !rst 
having to recoup investment in old systems. It did not have to build all the infrastructure it required 
by itself. And it knew exactly what the competition was o"ering. PowerCom announced its SIM 
cards would be “under as many Christmas trees as possible”13 but the launch ended up being 
delayed. “We will not launch until we are sure the quality is ready,” Allman stated to the media on 20 
December%2006.
3G & Switch
In an interview in May 2005, Bengt Strenge had argued that Namibia did not have the volumes to 
justify 3G since voice and sms were the “killer applications”14. He stated MTC had “no concrete plans” 
to introduce EDGE technology. However, with the advent of Leo on the horizon, MTC launched 
a 3G service using HSDPA technology on 15 December 2006. Since it started operating in 1995, 
MTC had used a GSM900 system (“2G”), later upgrading to GPRS (General Packet Radio Switching) 
in 2005 (“2.5G”). 3G refers to the third generation technologies. Many concluded that MTC’s rather 
rushed introduction of a 3G service was as a direct result of competition and hard on the heels 
of PowerCom’s announcement earlier in the year of its intention to introduce 3G, although MTC 
insisted it had already taken the decision to roll out 3G in October 2005, not long after Strenge had 
publically poo-pooed the idea.
MTC had already pre-empted the launch of Leo by introducing a 3G HSDPA service at the end of 
2006. Telecom did not take the entry of a new player lying down. On 23 November 2006 it launched 
a !xed-wireless service called “Switch” with great fanfare and a high-pro!le marketing campaign. 
Fixed wireless is a radio frequency-based mobile technology based on cells using masts and base 
stations. The !xed refers to the fact that it does not allow roaming between cells. However, because 
cells can be anything up to 40km2,it can cover a whole city such as Windhoek (although more 
masts are required for greater capacity). However, technically it is possible to link up cells to form 
a proper cellular network and this has happened in some countries. Telecom rolled out 800MHz 
Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) bought from Huwei Technologies of China for N$44 million 
in February 2006. This technology had the advantage that Telecom would no longer be responsible 
for cables to premises, the PABX or the telephone thus reducing maintenance and service costs. Its 
mobility made it far more convenient to customers and it allowed high speed Internet access about 
three times faster than ISDN. Switch only o"ered pre-paid options called Switch Easy and Switch 
Time in a clear bid to lure away lower income customers that formed the bulk of MTC’s customer 
base as well as those who could not a"ord Tango. Switch was initially o"ered in Windhoek, but 
Telecom promised it would be o"ered to 31 additional towns and rural settlements in future15. 
However, Telecom’s entry into mobile telephony caused friction with the NCC, which claimed it was 
not licensed to o"er mobile services despite having allocated Telecom the 800MHz frequency in 
February 2005. MTC’s new shareholders, Portugal Telecom, were also shocked to discover that the 
basis of their entry into the Namibian market had been changed: it had paid for 34% of MTC on the 
basis of one competitor in mobile telephony, not two. However, neither Portugal Telecom nor Leo 
can claim they were not aware of Telecom’s statutory rights prior to making their investments. 
The NCC was of the opinion that Switch was illegal16, but Government did not appear ready to let it 
act as an “arms-length” institution. In December Cabinet decided to create a new ad hoc committee 
under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister to look into the matter17. In March 2007 Cabinet tried 
to reach a compromise on Switch by allowing Telecom to o"er the service but limiting Switch to a 
radius of 60km and prohibiting roaming between towns. The uncertainty surrounding the service 
13  See “Cell Operator No. 2 Ready to Roll”, The Namibian, 16 August 2006.
14  “I do not think there is the demand for the type of data speed that 3G would allow in our market.”
  Bengt Strenge, Insight Namibia, June 2005.
15  See www.telecom.na
16  See “Telecom, NCC at Loggerheads”, The Namibian, 24 November 2006.
17  See “Recent Cabinet Resolutions”, The Namibian, 21 December 2006.
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continued for several years until Cabinet decided to lift all restrictions on Switch in May 2009 – three 
years after its original introduction – on the basis of a recommendation from the Attorney General. 
Switch was, however, never illegal18, and the “voluntarily” restriction to !xed-wireless for three years 
is likely to have damaged the brand and its adoption considerably. So much so that it might be 
advisable for Telecom Namibia to relaunch it services altogether, possibly as converged services.
Mobile Termination Rates
Despite the formal introduction of competition, Leo clearly struggled to make inroads into MTC’s 
market share (although the company has never published !gures or !nancial statements), not least 
because the cards were to a large extent stacked in MTC’s favour. The NCC had never regulated 
interconnection or termination charges in Namibia. When a call is made, originating on the network 
of one operator and terminating on the network of another, the customer is charged by the operator 
where the call originates but some cost is borne by the operator where the call terminates. The call 
charge therefore has to be split. How this was to be done is speci!ed in the licences of MTC and 
Leo but had not been enforced until July 2009. That meant that incumbents with a large number 
of existing clients could use high termination rates together with high o"-net call rates to shielded 
themselves from competition from newcomers. Interconnection charges for mobile-to-mobile calls 
were N$1.06 per minute while charges for mobile-to-!xed were 63 cents. International calls received 
locally on mobile phones through Telecom Namibia were subject to interconnection charges of 59 
cents per minute. 
This situation led to a battle, between MTC on the one side and Leo and Telecom on the other, 
which became heated and spilled over in public leading to the intervention of Minister Kaapanda in 
August 200819. The situation was !nally recti!ed when the NCC ruled in July 2009 that termination 
rates should be standardised to 60 cents per minute and that this should fall to 30 cents by January 
201120. An independent study had found that the estimated cost of  interconnection of an e$cient 
operator is 24 cents21. Because more people called MTC from the Telecom and Leo networks than 
vice versa, the new uni!ed charges meant that there continued to be net transfers to MTC from 
Telecom and Leo, though less so than before.
Leo
The longer Leo struggled to gain a foothold in the market, the greater the odds became that a larger 
player would come in and buy it. In August 2008 Leo announced it was changing its management 
agreement with TMP. Then in January 2009 the company suddenly announced it was to be bought 
by Telecelglobe – part of Egypt’s Orascom Group – for N$580 million. The deal went through and 
a new management team was quickly installed with Pakistani national Soban Pasha as MD. Later 
in that year in September, CellOne was rebranded as Leo – Swahili for “today”. However, despite 
numerous o"ers and more intense marketing, it was not clear by the end of 2009 that Leo was 
starting to become solidly pro!table.
Expansion Beyond Namibia’s Borders
In the search for new markets, Telecom Namibia has extended its reach into neighbouring countries. 
In 2004 it entered into an agreement with Mundo Startel of Angola. In 2005 Telecom teamed up 
with VSNL/Tata to become the Second National Operator in South Africa. In its latest annual report22, 
Telecom admitted it was struggling in the Angolan joint-venture but remained upbeat about Neotel 
where the consortium had successfully raised the funding to build the network. In 2009 Telecom and 
MTC jointly participated in the West Africa Cable Systems (WACS) linking Europe to various points 
on Africa’s western coast including South Africa. In need of additional funding, Telecom decided to 
tap the local bond market in 2008 and set about following NamPower’s example by seeking a credit 
rating from Fitch Ratings. It received an investment grade rating based on a Namibian Government 
guarantee and by the end of 2009 had succeeded in raising N$147 million out of a N$600 million 
note programme.
18  See Stork & Deen-Swarray, 2007.
19  See “Leo, Telecom Gang Up on MTC”, The Namibian, 27 August 2008.
20  See “NCC Slashes Mobile Charges”, The Namibian, 8 July 2009.
21  Research ICT Africa.
22  Telecom Namibia Annual Report 2007/08..
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Policy  &  Regulatory  Issues
Many of the most important changes in Namibia’s telecoms sector – the entry of Portugal Telecom, 
Leo, Orascom and Telecom’s Switch – came about in the absence of a clear and e"ective regulatory 
framework. The Communications Bill, !rst mooted in the Policy of 1999 and !rst discussed in 
2002, was only passed by Parliament in October 200923. Part of the reason for the delay lay in 
turf battles between the Ministries of Works, Transport and Communication and Information and 
Broadcasting, an issue that was !nally resolved with the creation of the Ministry of Broadcasting and 
Communication Technology in 2008. Further delays came about due to Government’s insistence 
that security issues be included within the Bill, giving the security services wide ranging powers to 
record messages and conversations.
The new Act contains many of the key ingredients required to develop a modern telecoms sector. 
It makes provision for an independent arms-length regulator, the Communications Regulatory 
Authority of Namibia (CRAN), !nanced by licence fees and a levy on the gross turnover of telecoms 
companies. It gives CRAN the powers to regulate both mobile and !xed line operators and the 
ability to grant technical and service neutral licences, that is, licences which are not dependent 
on any particular technology (!xed or wireless) or service. It will guarantee number portability, 
which will allow customers to move operator without having to change their numbers. The new Act 
stipulates further that telecoms companies must be 51% Namibian owned. Although this may make 
sense from a nationalistic and political perspective, this virtually dictates continued Government 
involvement in the sector since few private sector players in Namibia would have the means to raise 
a 51% stake in a telecoms company. 
A four person CRAN board was appointed by Cabinet for three years and announced in December 
2009. It consists of the chair, Lazarus Jacobs, deputy chair Hilma Hitula, Tulimevava Mufeti and Tylvas 
Shilongo. Jacobs is the director and shareholder of Paragon Investment Holdings. Hitula is the 
director of Hitula Property Investments and deputy chairperson of Lorentz Angula. Mufeti is Project 
Manager: Management Information Systems Development at the University of Namibia (UNAM), 
and Shilongo is Senior General Manager at the Namibia Central Intelligence Service. However, by 
May 2010 the Communications Act had not come into force, the post of CEO had not been !lled and 
the NCC remained the de facto regulator.
CRAN
The NCC has historically been a small, weak institution funded from the state budget under the vote 
of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. It employs just three professionals and has a budget 
of N$5.3 million which is vastly underspent. It has occasionally shown its teeth by, for example, 
refusing to allow MTC to raise prices since October 2004 (since when MTC has gone on to make even 
greater pro!ts). Under the new Communications Act this position of weakness is likely to change with 
the establishment of CRAN. There is a danger it could become yet another bloated parastatal agency 
with a large budget yet still unable to attract the skilled personnel required for telecoms regulation. 
One estimate24 suggests a 0.5% levy on Telecom and MTC would generate N$9.58 million, su$cient 
for proper regulation and enough to cover the outsourced research and international consultants 
required. By way of comparison, the Botswana Telecommunications Authority (BTA) established in 
1996, which already has a broader mandate than the NCC, generated revenue of P71 million in the 
year ending 31 March 2009 and employs some 64 people25 of which 39% are post-graduates. The 
Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) established in 2000, has a budget 
of ZAR 240 million and employs some 335 people26. With its board in place by the end of 2009, CRAN 
will soon be in a position to start hiring. The caliber of its CEO and the sta" it hires will be critical in 
determining its future performance.
23  Communications Act 2009, Act No. 8 of 2009.
24  Stork and Esselaar (2006).
25  See BTA Annual Report 2009 www.bta.org.bw
26  See ICASA Annual Report 2008/09 www.icasa.org.za
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Ownership
In contrast to times past, when it could be argued that state ownership was necessary to prevent 
ine$cient pricing by a natural monopoly, there is no longer sound economic logic in favour of state 
ownership in a sector where genuine competition can be created through intelligent regulation. As 
long as government remains a shareholder in one or more competing companies, there will always 
be an incentive to make regulatory decisions on the basis of what is best for the shareholder rather 
than the consumer and the national economy. Government has derived signi!cant income from 
its shareholdings in both Telecom and, to a far greater extent, MTC. Some have argued that this has 
constituted “taxation by the back door”. After all Government managed to buy 49% of MTC for N$500 
million and just two years later sell 34% for N$1.02 billion. In this situation, it will be hard to create 
a CRAN that is genuinely and credibly independent. Government’s record of allowing the NCC to 
operate as an “arms length” regulator is checkered. Economic principles suggest that any roadmap 
for the future should include the privatisation of Telecom Namibia and the further privatisation of 
MTC so that all three telecoms companies operate on a level playing !eld. 
Following the buy-back of 49% and the sale of 34% in MTC, the 15% di"erence was supposedly set 
aside to promote BEE, but this issue has fallen rather silent in recent years. A listing on the Namibian 
Stock Exchange (NSX) to open up ownership to the general public is also an option that could be 
considered. But a situation whereby one player is fully Government owned (Telecom), one partly 
Government owned (MTC) and one fully privately owned (Leo) could raise di$culties in a situation 
where the regulator may not be impartial.
Fixed-mobile Substitution
Changing technology is forcing people to ask whether there is any longer a need for a !xed line 
telecoms operator such as Telecom Namibia. Telecom has some 148,000 customers, compared to 
MTC’s 1.3 million. Given the right products and pricing, the market in Namibia may include anything 
up to 1.5 million people, the entire adult population of the country. Mobile telephony has the 
potential to deliver telecoms services far more cheaply and e"ectively to many more people than 
!xed line telephony and this has been accentuated with the arrival of 3G. As far as the retail market 
is concerned, the future appears to be wireless. Unless Telecom transforms itself into a fully-#edged 
mobile operator or adapts to delivering specialist services for business, its future looks bleak. It did 
not succeed in clinging on to its monopoly provision of international tra$c as both MTC and Leo 
were awarded international voice licences in July 2009. The expectation of declining international 
call revenues may explain its attempt to enter the mobile market via !xed-wireless CDMA as well as 
past talk of restructuring NPTH and taking over 51% of MTC27. The critical question is, will Government 
move to try and protect Telecom, allow it to merge with MTC or transform itself at some stage into 
a fully-#edged third mobile operator? 
Competition
Namibia is moving from a model which relies on state-owned monopolies to provide telecoms 
services, to a model which relies on competing companies with signi!cant private shareholdings 
to provide them. As some observers have already pointed out28, it will be di$cult for Leo to start 
a price war with such an entrenched and cash-rich player as MTC. Furthermore, Leo depends on 
cooperation with MTC to share its existing infrastructure. There is a danger that this relationship may 
become a bit too cosy. Collusion, implicit or explicit, could be the result, especially if the regulator 
remains weak and lacks the technical capacity to promote competition. But the prospect of Leo 
making money in Namibia’s small market against an entrenched player with a 14-year track record 
and which already claims to have 1.6 million customers is by no means certain. The real money is to 
be made with the 100,000 or so contract customers that exist in Namibia. Unless these customers are 
really fed up with MTC (and there may be signi!cant dissatisfaction due to lack of capacity especially 
at certain times of the week) it is hard to see Leo stealing enough market share to make money.
27  See “MTC, Telecom Cross Swords”, The Namibian, 14 June 2006
28  See Stork and  Deen-Swarray (2007)
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NPTH
Cabinet memoranda at the time viewed NPTH as a temporary vehicle allowing Telecom to subsidise 
Nampost, which was expected to take far longer to start breaking even. As things turned out, 
NamPost reached pro!tability far earlier than expected. Over time all three NPTH subsidiaries 
developed capabilities and assets in areas that were originally envisaged for NPTH, although all 
property used by the three subsidiaries is owned and maintained by NPTH. A key question is what 
NPTH functions should be in future. A SIDA29 concludes that “it has for some time been di$cult 
to imagine valid reasons for NPTH’s continued existence, as evidenced by the initiation of Cabinet 
level enquiries already in 1998 into the possible unbundling of NPTH’s operating companies”. 
The NPTH is unnecessarily duplicating cost structures and presents a ‘value trap’ considering that 
it has been paying dividends to government subsequent to its subsidiaries declaring their own 
dividends. However, NPTH is hardly a big expensive structure as its annual reports testify. Its property 
management activities pay for themselves and appear to be highly valued by its subsidiaries. Much 
of the past lack of pass through of dividends to the exchequer has to do with investment or buying 
back shares from previous shareholders, notably Telia and Swedfund. The recent payment of N$648 
million to Government out of the N$1.02 billion paid by Portugal Telecom came about due to the 
need to repay a N$300 million loan for the buy-back of the 49% in 200430. Of greater concern from 
a governance point of view is that the CEO of NPTH is none other than Frans Ndoroma, the MD 
of Telecom Namibia. A signi!cant “competitor” of MTC therefore has relatively open access to the 
mobile operator’s !nances and strategies. Unbundling of Telecom Namibia, NamPost and MTC 
would be a logical step in the process of liberalisation and subsequent privatisation of the sector.
29  Resource Paper 2 Cooperation between Namibia and Sweden in the Transport and Communications Sectors: 
  Commercialisation in the Namibian Transport and Communications Sectors, Herman Marais February 2006.
30  NPTH used N$200 million in cash from dividends and borrowed a further N$300 million to purchase the 49% 
  from Telia and Swedfund.
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Performance
Namibia’s telecommunication sector performance review is conducted from four perspectives: the 
Namibian economy, operators, consumers and regulators and policy makers. Figure 1 graphically 
displays the components of the sector performance review. First the link between sector performance 
and policy and regulation is evaluated, followed by an analysis of the contribution of the telecom 
sector to Namibia’s economy. The third section deals with the operators’ bottom line,, their !nancial 
performance and incentive to invest. The following section then discusses price developments and 
consumer interest, and the impact of regulatory interventions.
Figure 1: Components of the sector performance review
Link between Policy, Regulation and Sector Performance
The diagram below illustrates the links between policy, regulation and sector performance. Parliament 
passes the laws that constitute the legal framework of a country. The legal framework establishes 
the regulator and de!nes its powers and duties. Parliament and the Ministry of Information & 
Communication Technology develop the overall strategy for the telecommunications sector – what 
its objectives are and how it is going to encourage investment. These become concretised in the 
form of laws. The implementation of these laws (and their interpretation) is left to the regulator. 
The Minister can also in#uence regulation through policy directives. Policy directives are meant to 
provide greater clarity for the regulator (and the public) on what the policy for the sector means and 
how the law should be interpreted. 
Figure 2: Link between policy regulation and sector performance
Directives are not intended to be speci!c pieces of legislation – that would impinge on the 
regulator’s independence. Four components (parliament, the Minister, the legislative framework 
and the regulator) have a direct impact upon the structure of the market (how many operators 
there are) and, in turn, upon the conduct of these players. The most obvious mechanism that 
determines market structure is the licensing process. The more operators that are licensed, the 
greater the likelihood that there will be competition. However, if a market has been dominated 
by a limited number of players (as is the case in most countries because telecommunication was 
historically considered a natural monopoly) then competition policy plays a key role in ensuring 
that players do not abuse their dominant positions. Regulation can therefore have a signi!cant 
in#uence on the conduct of players as well. Each of these components impacts upon sector 
performance. Analysis of the telecom sector that ignores any of these components runs the risk of 
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tends to ignore the policy choices, legislative framework and regulatory competence of the 
institutions that created the framework for telecom companies to compete in.
Parliament passed a new Communication Act in November 2009, which requires the Minister to 
announce its commencement date. This had not happened by May 2010. The new Act and its 
implementation by the new regulator, CRAN, will impact on the sector performance. and will be 
analysed in the next sector performance review. This review is based on the existing legislation and 
regulation through the NCC and the line Ministry for Telecom Namibia (MICT).
Namibia
The contribution of the communication sector to GDP has steadily increased during the past 18 
years (see Figure 3). A remarkable jump in GDP contribution is notable between 1999 and 2000, 
which is linked to prepaid mobile taking o" in Namibia.
Figure 3: GDP contribution in constant 1995 Prices - N$ million (source: national accounts, CBS)
The percentage contribution to GDP, which depends on many factors outside the communication 
sector, has been around 3% in the period since 2002.
Figure 4: GDP contribution of Post and telecommunication in % (source: national accounts, CBS)
MTC employment increases from year to year while Telecom Namibia’s sta" numbers decrease. Total 
employment by the telecom sector is likely to have increased when considering the employment 
that stems from retail businesses selling handsets and airtime, as well as other equipment suppliers 
and service companies. 
Operators
Telecom Namibia’s revenues have increased slowly but steadily over the past 15 years. Company 
pro!ts, return on equity (ROE) and pro!t margins have #uctuated and are much lower than they 
used to be in 2003 to 2005. The recent ROE would hardly be enough to compensate an investor 
for the value lost due to in#ation. What is clear is that Telecom Namibia is struggling to become a 
#ourishing and growing business. Its strategy seems to focus more on preserving current revenue 
streams than growing the business. A key mistake that seems to be made by Telecom Namibia is 
to link its wholesale and retail businesses. Using wholesale prices to protect retail revenues leads 
to sub-optimal business performance and holds back economic development. Yet this mistake 
is being made around the world by incumbents, over and over again. As a principle, wholesale 
and retail should be seen as separate pro!t centres, both trying to maximise pro!ts on their own. 
ADSL could have been rolled out much quicker than it was, for example. By the end of 2009 
merely 6000 ADSL connection had been installed. Wholesale would try to push out as may ADSL 
connections as possible, whether to Telecom Namibia’s retail section or any other reseller in such a 
set-up. That helps to reduce waiting times for installations and lets the retail arms compete against 
other resellers. If resellers then sold more than Telecom Namibia’s retail arms, this would be an 
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competition the areas of improvement are not obvious and incentives to improve services are 
minimal. What counts is not market share (100% of ADSL connections) but the bottom-line. Telecom 
Namibia needs to learn from its mistakes and the mistakes of other incumbent operators and create 
competition within the company to improve e$ciency and pro!tability. It would, for example, have 
been better to have a continuous revenue stream from 20,000 ADSL connections, 80% installed by 
resellers, than having revenues from 6,000 ADSL lines, all installed by Telecom Namibia. Retail would, 
in this example, only have sold 4,000 ADSL lines and resellers 16,000. But wholesale would make a lot 
more money. The fact that resellers did better would then help to improve Telecom Namibia’s retail 
business. The same would be true for leased lines.
Expanding to neighbouring countries may be a very pro!table strategy if supported by a growing 
business at home. A crumbling business at home might make such strategies risky. Neotel, for 
example, is unlikely to turn into a cash cow any time soon. Little relief can hence be expected from 
investments to compensate for falling !xed-voice and international call revenues. Key for Telecom 
Namibia will be to turn the domestic market into a growth market. Less relevant for that will be 
how things have been done in the past and more relevant will be how things can be done to grow 
customers and turnover, in both retail and wholesale.
Table 4: Telecom Namibia (company): Key Financial Indicators
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Revenue 
(N$m)
652 764 896 981 1,020 1,055 1,058 1,061 1,081
Taxation 
(N$m)
21.0 16.2 27.9 40.7 48.2 48.1 61.8 27.9 33.1
Net pro!t after tax 
(N$m)
35.3 26.6 47.5 69.9 121 84.6 112.3 23.2 46.9
Total assets 
(N$m)
1,010 1,086 1,189 1,290 1,391 1,267 1,781 2,040 2,231
Shareholders’ Equity 
(N$m)
375 395 419 480 566 627 980 1,015 1,062
Dividend (N$m) - 8 3 8 12 24 17 0 0
Asset Turnover 1.55 1.42 1.33 1.32 1.36 1.20 1.68 1.92 2.06
Return on Equity 9.4% 6.7% 11.3% 14.5% 21.4% 13.5% 11.5% 2.3% 4.4%
Financial Leverage 2.684 2.751 2.84 2.686 2.457 2.022 1.817 2.009 2.1
Pro!t Margin 5.4% 3.5% 5.3% 7.1% 11.9% 8.0% 10.6% 2.2% 4.3%
DELs in 1000 110.2 117.4 121.4 127.6 136.4 139.0 136.2 138.2
Sta" 1,667 1,654 1,574 1,548 1,516 1,463 1,306 1,069 1,025
Source: Telecom Namibia Annual Reports
MTC’s return on equity was very high at around 50% until 2005/6, when the arrival of competition 
in the mobile telephony sector led to a drop to a still-high 37% in 2006, 34% in 2007 and 32% in 
2008. The same trend can be observed for pro!t margins, which peaked in 2005 and have since then 
begun to decline. MTC is a very good investment, not just in comparison with Telecom Namibia but 
generally. It is run pro!tably and manages to grow its market in terms of subscribers and turnover 
from year to year while expanding its network, upgrading to latest technologies and increasing the 
value of the company.
Selling a 34% share of MTC to Portugal Telecom has been pro!table for both, the government and 
Portugal Telecom. A model that could also be envisaged for Telecom Namibia. Seeking a partner 
with global technical and management expertise could still turn Telecom Namibia into a cash cow 
whilst better serving the Namibia’s development goals. 
MTC spectacularly underestimated price elasticity of demand, both for access and usage, when it 
still operated as a monopoly. Competition forced it to lower prices and introduce new lower priced 
products. MTC’s declared strategy is to maintain revenues not by lowering prices but o"ering more 
for the money. This has taken the form of doubling bundled minutes or recharges with on-net 
airtime. These are e"ective price decreases for the consumer as the OECD basket methodology in 
the next section shows.





Table 5: MTC: Key Financial Indicators
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Revenue 
(N$m) 
191 262 372 504 687 769 937 1,113 1,232 1.390
Shareholders’ Equity 
(N$m)
81 124 194 297 451 646 903 999 1,136 1,153
Taxation 
(N$m)
15.0 25.8 47.6 74.2 119.0 145.5 171.3 177.0 180.7 198.8
Net pro!t after tax 
(N$m)
39 56 99 150 235 293 337 340 358 388
Total assets 
(N$m)
241 345 429 553 745 915 1,169 1,329 1,608 1,632
Dividend 
(N$m)
12.5 12.5 30.0 47.5 80.0 110.0 80.0 245.0 220.8 369.5
Dividend as % of after 
tax pro!t
32.2% 22.3% 30.4% 31.6% 34.0% 37.5% 23.7% 72.1% 61.7% 95.4%
Return on Equity 47.9% 45.0% 50.9% 50.7% 52.1% 45.4% 37.3% 34.0% 31.5% 33.6%
Pro!t Margin 20.3% 21.3% 26.5% 29.9% 34.2% 38.1% 36.0% 30.5% 29.0% 27.9%
EBITDA margin 61% 60.2% 52.2% 50.9% 53.8%
Active SIM cards in 1000 71 106.6 143.4 223.7 343.6 403.7 555.5 743.5 1,009 1,284
Sta" 156 190 229 276 272 296 397 416
Monthly ARPU in N$ 224 205 216 188 167 159 141 125 102 90
Source: MTC Annual Reports
MTC’s average revenue per user (ARPU) dropped from N$283 in 1999 to N$90 in 2009, a development 
expected for an expanding market since new subscribers are predominantly from lower income 
categories. An ARPU of N$90 or about 12US$ is still incredibly high when compared with budget 
telecoms from Asia that run their businesses pro!tably based on a below 2US$ ARPU model.
That might provide an idea for an investor for Telecom Namibia, a company from India or Sri Lanka 
that runs CDMA based on a below 2US$ business model. It would not mean that MTC and Leo would 
in such an event emulate such a business model and leave Namibia with budget operators only. The 
budget operator could occupy a niche for the bottom end.
Consumers
In October 2005, in an Insight Magazine interview, Bengt Strenge, (Managing Director of MTC) 
dismayed by a price comparison, stated: “We can reduce prices and thus reduce dividends ... have 
no capacity to reinvest ... operate as an SOE that requires regular government subsidies ... shun all 
areas of the country that don’t o"er relatively quicker returns on investment.” Since then prices have 
dropped by more than half in real terms (see Figure 5), while subscriber numbers, base stations and 
dividends paid have tripled. Investment and after tax pro!ts were considerably higher in 2009 than 
they were in 2005, despite lower prices. Competition leads to lower prices and lower prices lead to 
more subscribers. “Sell little dearly or more cheaply” holds.
An international comparison conducted by Research ICT Africa shows that Namibia fares well. 
The data is collected through a webpage (www.researchictafrica-data.net) and comprises 184 
mobile prepaid products from 112 operators from 26 countries. The OECD mobile pricing basket 
methodology of 2006 was implemented with minor adaptations. MMSs were, for example, not 
included because they have not taken o" in Africa. Friends and family o"ers or preferred number 
plans, which o"er unlimited calls to certain numbers on the same network, were not taken into 
account as they make the process too complex. Promotions for particular days or for certain recharge 
denominations were also not taken into account.
Tables 6 and 7 compare the cheapest prepaid product available from incumbent operators according 
to the 2006 de!nition, to the cheapest prepaid product available in a country. The di"erence 
between these methodologies represents the pressure of competition within these countries and 
indicates who o"ers the cheapest mobile prepaid o"ers.
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Figure 5: MTC cheapest product (prepaid and postpaid for OECD usage baskets [2006] de!nition) in N$
Other characteristics have been included in table 7 such as the number of operators and years 
since last market entry to demonstrate that there are no linear relationships between individual 
characteristics. A di"erence between the cheapest product in a country and the cheapest product 
from dominant operators may measure the competitive pressure but may also have no explanatory 
power. In Botswana, for example, the dominant operator, Mascom, is also the cheapest operator. 
Mascom probably became the dominant operator because of its price leadership. Orange and 
Mascom were licensed at the same time. 
Price developments and competitive pressure are a function of many factors and are path dependent. 
Applying the basket methodology to all operators and analysing the di"erences between cheapest 
and dominant operator adds one more perspective and provides regulators with one more tool in 
their toolbox to monitor the level of competition in the sector.




product  in  the  country
Cheapest  prepaid  
product  from  dominant  
operators
Percentage  by  which  
dominant  operator  is  
more  expensive  than  
cheapest  in  country
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High
Botswana 5.04 10.28 20.67 5.04 10.28 20.67 0% 0% 0%
Ethiopia 3.74 7.59 14.98 3.74 7.59 14.98 0% 0% 0%
Mozambique 7.45 15.07 29.88 7.45 15.07 29.88 0% 0% 0%
Senegal 6.12 12.31 24.25 6.12 12.31 24.25 0% 0% 0%
South Africa 7.64 15.38 29.63 7.64 16.12 33.13 0% 5% 12%
Tunisia 5.06 10.24 20.19 5.06 10.24 20.19 0% 0% 0%
Zambia 6.57 13.28 25.99 6.60 13.54 26.37 0% 2% 1%
Cameroon 8.59 16.42 30.45 9.30 17.91 33.22 8% 9% 9%
Uganda 6.33 12.90 24.05 6.95 13.90 26.85 10% 8% 12%
Burkina Faso 11.04 22.65 45.19 12.54 25.98 52.52 14% 15% 16%
Côte d’Ivoire 7.00 14.34 28.88 8.15 16.34 31.59 17% 14% 9%
Ghana 2.29 4.36 8.01 3.04 6.10 12.16 33% 40% 52%
Benin 4.92 11.05 24.75 7.50 14.74 27.84 52% 33% 12%
Kenya 3.35 6.37 11.42 5.93 11.82 22.78 77% 86% 100%
Namibia 5.06 10.74 22.19 8.96 18.27 36.19 77% 70% 63%
Rwanda 3.74 7.94 16.59 6.87 13.63 26.45 84% 72% 59%
Nigeria 3.63 7.58 15.48 7.76 15.85 32.13 114% 109% 108%
Tanzania 2.93 6.06 12.24 7.26 15.24 31.84 148% 152% 160%
Table 6 indicates that the competitive pressure in Namibia is high. The incumbent is 77% more 
expensive than the cheapest product in the market (Switch from Telecom Namibia) for the OECD 














Sep-05 Dec-08 May-10 May-10 (2005 Prices)
Namibian  Telecommunication  Sector  Performance  Review17
South Africa and 
Botswana are still 
ahead in mobile 
teledensity
Table 7: Link between price di"erences between incumbents and cheapest products available in a coun-







































Botswana 0% 0% 0% 3 2 Mascom Mascom 77.34
Ethiopia 0% 0% 0% 1 11 ETC ETC 2.42
Mozambique 0% 0% 0% 2 7 mCel mCel 19.68
Senegal 0% 0% 0% 3 1 Orange Orange 44.13
South Africa 0% 5% 11% 4 4 MTN MTN & Vodacom 90.60
Tunisia 0% 0% 0% 2 8 Tunisiana Tunisiana 84.59
Zambia 0% 2% 1% 3 7 MTN Zain 28.04
Cameroon 8% 8% 8% 2 10 Orange MTN 32.28
Uganda 9% 7% 10% 4 2 Uganda Telecom MTN 27.02
Burkina Faso 12% 13% 14% 3 9 Telcel Zain 16.76
Côte d’Ivoire 14% 12% 9% 4 3 Moov Orange & MTN 50.74
Ghana 25% 29% 34% 5 3 Tigo MTN 49.55
Benin 34% 25% 11% 5 3 Libercom MTN & Moov 41.85
Kenya 44% 46% 50% 3 2 Orange Safarico 42.06
Namibia 44% 41% 39% 3 1 Telecom Namibia MTC 49.39
Rwanda 46% 42% 37% 3 1 Rwandatel MTN 13.61
Nigeria 53% 52% 52% 7 4 Starcomms GloMobile & MTN 41.66
Tanzania 60% 60% 62% 9 5 Benson Vodacom 30.62
The falling prices of mobile communication in Namibia as a result of competition have been 
mirrored in other countries, some being even more successful. Figure 6 compares the cost of 
prepaid products across 18 African countries covered by Research ICT Africa. Namibia occupies the 
middle of the !eld in terms of cheapest products available in the country but is at the top end of 
the cheapest product available from dominant operators, in this case MTC. MTC is the third most 
expensive prepaid operator in the 18 country comparison, surpassed only by Cameroon and Burkina 
Faso. This is signi!cant since it means the majority of people pay high prices, with MTC having a 
market share of around 80%.
The total subscriber numbers reported by operators (more than 1.6 million) are likely to overstate 
the actual number of mobile users considerably. The need or desire for duplicated SIM cards seems 
to have increased in Namibia for several reasons. First, postpaid MTC subscribers cannot transfer 
airtime to prepaid subscribers due to the VAT that is charged on prepaid airtime and the involved 
complexity. Sending airtime to family members and friends would require a postpaid subscriber 
to purchase a prepaid card as well. A second reason is the number of di"erent promotions run 
by operators. Namibians may not only hold prepaid SIM cards from di"erent operators but even 
multiple SIM cards from the same operator to utilise promotions.
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Figure 6: Prepaid prices for OECD low user basket in US$
Policy Makers & Regulators
The years 2008 and 2009 have been record years in terms of policy making and implementation:
A single ministry has been put in charge for sector policies instead of having one for !xed 
and one for mobile telephony;
New ICT policies were formulated;
A new communications Act was passed by parliament;
A termination rate dispute was settled within nine months, setting standards for the region.
Minister Joel Kaapanda has driven widespread reforms within the sector. The second mobile licence 
and subsequent competition in the mobile sector in 2006 was the !rst game changer. Enforcing 
the licence conditions of Leo and MTC (termination rates based on cost) in 2009 added to that new 
game being played more fairly. 
During the termination rate debate in 2009, MTC argued that its EBITDA (Earning before Interest, Tax, 
Depreciation and Amortisation) margin would drop to 36% if termination rates were reduced to the 
cost of an e$cient operator. The termination rates have since then dropped to N$0.4 from N$1.06, 
while MTC’s EBIDTA margin rose from 50.9% in 2008 to 53.8% in 2009. The !nancial year ending 
September 2009 only covers three months after the !rst termination rate drop. The 2010 !nancial 
report will reveal more. One thing is clear however: MTC will invest more, not less as threatened, 
since the lower termination rates will lead to fairer competition and hence the need to stay head of 
the !eld. MTC announced in its 2009 !nancial report investments into 4G technology (LTE = Long 
Term Evolution) of N$180 million and N$ 115 million into the West African Cable System.
Also remarkable is that MTC’s user numbers increased further, to nearly 1.3 million subscribers. Leo 
and Telecom Namibia also managed to attract new customers, indicating that the lower prices led 
to an expansion of the market. 
MTC’s prices have equally not increased as predicted by itself but have instead decreased or 
remained the same. Figure 5 shows the cost of OECD usage bundles for the cheapest postpaid or 
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Retail prices for 
all products from 
all operators 
have remained 
constant or have 
dropped after the 
termination rate 
reductions
in December 2009, and a new substantially cheaper postpaid product was introduced in early 2010 
e"ectively reducing MTC prices again. Telecom Namibia and LEO also o"ered new products and 
cheaper prices.
Table 8: MTC key performance indicators
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Subscribers 403,743 555,501 743,509 1,008,658 1,283,530
EBITDA Margin 61% 60.2% 52.2% 50.9% 53.8%
After-tax pro!t in million N$ 292.9 337.2 339.6 356.2 387.5
Dividend paid in million N$ 110 80 245 221 370
Dividend payment as share of  
after-tax pro!t
37.6% 23.7% 72.1% 62.0% 95.5%
34% of dividends in million N$ 83.3 75.1 125.8
Figure 7 shows the cost of the OECD low user basket prior to and after two termination rate 
reductions for MTC. None of MTC’s product increased in price. The OECD basket methodology does 
not capture recent specials and promotions run by MTC, such as 100 free SMS and doubling up of 
prepaid airtime, that also reduce the cost of usage. Telecom Namibia not only reduced its o"-net 
rates following the termination rate reductions, but also on-net prices, leading to prepaid prices for 
the cost of the low user bundle being only a third in March 2010 compared to April 2008.
Leo restructured its product o"erings and added nine new postpaid products. The new postpaid 
products are di"erent in nature and cannot be compared to the basket price of the postpaid 
products prior to the termination rate cuts. Figures 9 and 10 thus display postpaid and prepaid 
calling rates directly. None of the tari"s increased. This shows that there is clearly no waterbed e"ect 
in Namibia, not even for a single product or tari".
The results for Namibia, the telecom sector and consumers have been spectacular. Lower prices 
through competition have let to an expansion of the market.
Figure 7: Cost of OECD low user basket in N$/ZAR for MTC
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Termination rate 
reductions did not 
lead to a waterbed 
e!ect
Figure 8: Cost of OECD low user basket in N$/ZAR for Telecom Namibia
Figure 9: Leo’s postpaid rates compared
Figure 10: Leo’s prepaid rates compared
N$/ZAR
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The perception 









Professionals and stakeholders from Namibia’s telecommunication sector and civil society were 
requested to make their assessments of the Telecom Regulatory Environment (TRE) for the period 
2008 to 2009. The TRE is a tool for assessing the performance of the policy and laws a"ecting the 
telecom sector and the various government entities responsible for implementation. The TRE 
scores are based on perceptions and need to be assessed against actual developments in the 
sector (subscriber numbers, prices, dispute resolutions, changes in laws and policies). The TRE can 
be used by regulators and policy makers to assess their own performance and identify areas for 
improvement, and for investors to assess regulatory risks in a country.
The TRE is assessed for the !xed-line, mobile and broadband sub-sectors individually. The TRE is 
further assessed for seven dimensions: market entry, allocation of scarce resources, interconnection, 
regulation of anti-competitive practices, universal service obligation, tari" regulation and quality 
of service. Using the Likert Scale, each of the seven dimensions is rated on the scale from -2 to 
+2, with -2=Highly Ine"ective and +2=Highly E"ective. The responses are further analysed in three 
categories:
Category 1: Stakeholders directly a"ected by telecom sector regulation (operators, industry 
associations, equipment suppliers, investors)
Category 2: Stakeholders who analyse the sector with broader interest (!nancial institutions, 
equity research analysts, credit rating agencies, telecom consultants, law !rms)
Category 3: Stakeholders with an interest in improving the sector to help the public 
(academics, research organisations, journalists, telecom user groups, civil society, former 
members of regulatory and other government agencies, donors)
Figure 11 compares the results from the same survey conducted in 2006 with the one conducted 
at the end of 2009.
Figure 11: TRE scores of 2009 compared to 2006
The regulatory environment for broadband, !xed-line and mobile telephony is on average seen 
as being slightly ine"ective (-0.5), which is a major improvement over the average rating of 2006 
(-1.2, i.e between ine"ective and very ine"ective). The improvement in the score for interconnection 
regulation from -1.1 to -0.2 is remarkable, and can be attributed to the resolution of the termination 
rate dispute in 2009. Market entry has also been assessed more positively compared to 2006, with 
three mobile operators and several strong broadband providers now existent.
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Telecommunication  Regulatory  Environment  (TRE)
Figure 12 demonstrates that a large share of improved perception is due to developments in 
the mobile sector. Mobile telephony regulation fares slightly better than !xed and broadband, in 
particular for regulating interconnection and market entry.
The broadband (VANS) sector remains unregulated in Namibia. However, several insiders interviewed 
indicated that Telecom Namibia is e"ectively regulating it since it has the infrastructure monopoly. 
Regulatory intervention will be required if Telecom Namibia does not separate its wholesale from 
its retail business. Several stakeholders complained that Telecom Namibia o"ers leased lines to 
corporate clients for less than it is reselling to them, making it impossible for them to compete. Such 
practices warrant investigation and regulatory intervention when found to be the case.
Figure 12: Perception of Namibia’s Telecommunication Regulatory Environment by sector
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Conclusions  and  Recommendations
Since the last sector performance review of 2006 a lot has changed in Namibia’s ICT sector for 
the better. Namibia has now three mobile operators, a single ministry in charge of policy for the 
sector, new policies, a new Act, and soon also a new stronger and independent regulator. Namibia 
has started to catch up with South Africa and Botswana. Prices have more than halved for mobile 
telephony and Internet access, and broadband has found its way to Namibia in mobile and !xed 
versions.
The key !ndings of this report are that:
The contribution of the communication sector to GDP has steadily increased during the past 
18 years.
MTC is #ourishing while Telecom Namibia is increasingly struggling to deliver returns that 
would be expected from any owner other than government.
Namibia fares well when comparing the cheapest prepaid product available in a country, 
occupying the middle of the !eld in a comparison of 18 African countries. However, for the 
cheapest product available from dominant operators, in this case MTC, Namibia is the third 
most expensive prepaid operator, surpassed only by Cameroon and Burkina Faso. This is 
signi!cant since it means the majority of people pay high prices, with MTC having a market 
share of around 80% and the bulk of its subscribers being on prepaid.
Lowering mobile termination rates towards the cost of an e$cient operator increased 
competition in the sector and led to lower prices, more subscribers and an even better 
performance of the incumbent mobile operator, MTC, which claimed that the opposite 
would be the case. There certainly has been no waterbed e"ect.
Perceptions of stakeholders regarding the regulatory environment improved dramatically 
compared to 2006, indicating a well received change.
Many challenges are still awaiting Namibia. Government would be well advised to sell a large share 
of Telecom Namibia to a strong operator with low cost CMDA expertise. Telecom Namibia will need 
to change course and focus on pro!tability or face the risk of becoming another indebted SOE with 
decreasing signi!cance for Namibia’s telecommunication sector.
The !xed-line sector may require regulatory intervention, separating wholesale from resale and the 
unbundling of the local loop to allow other operators access to Telecom Namibia’s customers. That 
might sound like a threat to Telecom Namibia’s existence but is likely to be a blessing. Similarly, 
competition has been a blessing to MTC, which is now a much stronger and more pro!table 
company than it ever has been.
The new regulator, CRAN, needs to build regulatory capacity and establish credibility in the market. 
Licences and laws need to be enforced consistently and transparently. The regulator needs to 
balance consumers’ interests and return on investment. Namibia’s 13 year mobile monopoly has 
made that easy for the period 2006 to 2009. Lower prices increased consumer welfare and provided 
operators with more pro!ts and reasons to invest. The future may hold trade-o"s that need to be 
carefully balanced.
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Telecom  Terms  
3G – Third generation technology provides the ability to transfer both voice data and non-voice 
data. 3G often operates on di"erent frequencies to 2G which has required mobile operators to build 
entirely new networks and licence entirely new frequencies at considerable cost. About 25 countries 
around the world have 3G networks. 3G requires di"erent handsets to 2G.
ADSL – Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line is a technology that allows faster data transmission over 
a copper cable than a conventional modem can provide. It is commonly used by users who require 
more bandwidth in one direction, such as faster downloads, but who do not require bandwidth in 
the other direction.
Base station – the infrastructure that determines the location and extent of a cell and transmits 
signals to and from handsets.
Broadband – a signalling method in telecommunications which handles a wide range of frequencies 
that can be divided into channels or bits. The wider the bandwidth, the more data can be carried.
CDMA – Code Division Multiple Access is a mobile digital radio technology that permits greater 
sharing of the same frequency channel and which has the advantage that a larger number of 
phones can be served by a smaller number of cell sites.
Cellular telephony – telephony that employs mobile radiotelephones which use a network of short-
range transmitters located in overlapping cells throughout a region, with a central station making 
connections to regular telephone lines.
EDGE technology – represents a further improvement of GPRS and allows higher speed data 
transmission.
Fixed-line telephony – telephony that employs a physical line, usually made out of either copper 
or optic !bre, to transmit voice or data, as opposed to wireless telephony which makes use of radio 
waves.
Fixed-wireless – refers to wireless telephony that is limited to a certain area and cannot roam 
between cells across a wider region.
GPRS – General Packet Radio Switching is a system that introduces more e$cient packets as 
opposed to circuit switching onto GSM.
GSM – Global System for Mobile communications is the most popular technology standard for 
mobile phones worldwide and for allowing roaming between operators. Both its signalling and 
speech channels are digital call quality which means it is considered a second generation (2G) 
system.
HSDPA – High Speed Downlink Packet Access is a 3G technology allowing for higher data transfer 
speeds.
Interconnection rate – the cost charged by one operator for a call that originates from another 
operator.
ISDN – Integrated Services Digital Network is a circuit switched digital technology that allows the 
digital transmission of voice and data over ordinary telephone copper wires resulting in better 
quality and higher speeds than with analogue systems.
Killer application – the use of a technology that consumers really want and are willing to pay for.
Number portability – the ability of telecoms consumers to keep their phone number when they 
change service provider.
O!-net – refers to transmission on the network belonging to another operator.
On-net – refers to transmission on the network belonging to the same operator.
Prepaid services – services that are paid for before they are used rather than paid for afterwards 
under a normal contract.
Universal Access Obligation – the obligation for an operator to provide services to the entire 
population of a country or region.
VoIP – Voice over Internet Protocol, which allows voice to be transmitted over the Internet.
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